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Government funding of non-governmental
organisations and the implied freedom of
political communication: The constitutionality of
gag clauses
ANTHONY GRAY
University of Southern Queensland
Provisions in government funding agreements with non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) may constrain the ability of these organisations to
contribute to political debate. NGOs perceive risks to their funding if they
criticise government policy. Such organisations play a significant role in the
democratic process, and this article examines the applicability of the
constitutional freedom of political communication to ‘gag clauses’. Australian
courts have not considered the constitutional freedom in this context, but the
Supreme Court of the United States has considered the question in relation to
the First Amendment. The article shows what can be learned from American
jurisprudence and Australian case law in order to challenge such provisions.
Keywords: advocacy; constitution; First Amendment; funding agreements;
gag clauses; implied freedom of communication
Introduction
Australian state governments have attempted in recent years to restrict the ability of
government-funded services, such as community legal centres, to engage in lobbying
or advocate political change. For example, the Principles for Funding of Legal Assist-
ance Services in NSW states that funding for ‘legal assistance services’ at Legal Aid
NSW or NSW community legal centres should not be used for ‘political advocacy or
political activism’. Section 24 of the Tasmanian Forests Agreement Act 2013, an
agreement between governments and environmental groups on Tasmanian forestry,
requires regular assessment of the ‘durability’ of the agreement, including assessment
of the extent of ‘substantial active protests’ about environmental matters in that state.
Some have interpreted this as a gag on environmental protest as a condition of the
funding (Denniss 2013).
Government attempts to control speech are not new. Precedents include newspaper-
licensing in England (Milton 1644), taxes on certain forms of speech,1 and arguably
Anthony Gray is Professor of Law at the University of Southern Queensland.
1See, for instance, Grosjean v American Press Co Inc (1936) 297 US 233, 246.
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the federal government’s now abandoned 2013 media reforms involving the proposed
creation of an office to oversee complaints about the press. Restrictions on non-gov-
ernmental organisations (NGOs) have existed for some time (Lyons 2003). The recent
High Court Aid/Watch decision confirmed that advocacy by an organisation did not
disqualify it from designation as a ‘charity’.2 Proposed legislation in 2003,
however, would have disqualified a charity from tax-exempt status if it engaged in
advocacy or attempted to change government policy (Maddison, Denniss and Hamil-
ton 2004: 2; O’Connell, Martin and Chia 2013: 293).
An Australian study regarding NGOs and democracy found that 58 per cent of
NGOs believed that governments were attempting to silence debate (Maddison,
Denniss and Hamilton 2004). Some 76 per cent of respondents disagreed that
‘current Australian political culture encourages public debate’, and a similar percen-
tage reported pressure to amend their public statements in accordance with current
government policy. About 90 per cent agreed that NGOs that criticised government
decisions or policy risked having their funding reduced (Hamilton and Maddison
2007: 91–94; Maddison, Denniss and Hamilton 2004: 38–39). The relevant
funding agreement specifically restricted the organisation from commenting on gov-
ernment policy in fewer than 30 per cent of cases. Between 50 and 72 per cent of
respondents (depending on whether they were fully funded by government, partly
funded or funded for specific projects), however, believed that the funding restricted
their comment on government policy. This suggests a significant discrepancy
between the wording of agreements and the perceptions of signatories. Recent pub-
licity about such clauses indicates that their use is increasing, making explicit what
NGOs understand to have been the case for some time.
Suppression of political advocacy by NGOs is contrary to the tenets of liberal-
democratic institutions and processes (Melville and Perkins 2003: 97). As Mill
argued:
No argument, we may suppose, can now be needed against permitting a legislative
or executive, not identified with the interest of the people, to prescribe opinions to
them, and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowed to
hear… all silencing of opinion is an assumption of infallibility. (2002: 83)
Fundamental to democratic society is the right to advocate change. Without lobby
groups or champions for change, reform is more difficult. Lobby groups have
power as a collective voice not available to the individual. Community legal
centres are well positioned to be aware of grassroots community concerns about
the impact of laws on particular groups, which are often marginalised or otherwise
without a strong voice.
This article considers the implied freedom of political communication in the
context of clauses limiting free speech. The High Court has not considered
the implied freedom in relation to funding agreements containing gag clauses. The
Supreme Court of the United States, however, has considered an equivalent right,
and I examine these cases to determine the position according to Australian consti-
tutional principles. The article considers the theoretical bases upon which the court
might strike down such laws, including the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
2Aid/Watch Inc v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539, 556–57.
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and the principle of inalienability of constitutional freedoms. It examines the argu-
ment that an organisation has no right to be funded, so it is permissible to fund it
with conditions, which the organisation is legally free to accept or not.
Implied freedom of political communication in Australia
In the 1990s, the High Court of Australia recognised an implied freedom of political
communication in the Constitution (Bronitt and Williams 1996; Gelber 2011; Kirk
1995; Meagher 2005; Patmore 1998; Stone 1998, 2001; Williams 1996).3 The
judges found that the Constitution made representative democracy central to govern-
ance in Australia; for representative democracy to operate effectively, political com-
munication must be preserved. The court characterised political communication as a
negative right, offering protection from laws that infringe the right, rather than a posi-
tive right to sue. The right is not absolute. As with most other rights, the court applied
a proportionality test to examine the constitutional validity of laws that infringed such
a right. The court developed a two-stage test.
Does the law in question effectively burden freedom of communication about gov-
ernment or political matters4 in terms or effect? If so, is the law reasonably appropri-
ate and adapted to serving a legitimate end in a manner compatible with
representative and responsible government, which the Constitution prescribes?5 If
the answer to the first question is yes, and the answer to the second is no, then the
law is unconstitutional.
The court has emphasised the centrality of freedom of political discussion to the
system of representative democracy (Mill 2002: 88; Patmore 1998: 100–07). As Chief
Justice Mason argued in Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth:6
Only by exercising that freedom can the citizen communicate his or her views on the
wide range of matters that may call for, or are relevant to, political action or decision.
Only by exercising that freedom can the citizen criticise government decisions and
actions, seek to bring about change, call for action where none has been taken, and
in this way influence elected representatives… individual judgment, whether that
of the elector, the representative or the candidate, on so many issues turns upon free
public discussion in the media of the views of all interested persons, groups and
bodies and on public participation in, and access to, that discussion. (emphasis added)
Ely claimed that the core of representative democracy includes political change, and
courts should intervene when:
The ins are choking off the channels of political change to ensure they will stay in
and the outs will stay out… (or) an effective majority are systematically
3For example, Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Lange v
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
4The precise meaning of these terms is elusive (Bronitt and Williams 1996: 298–99; Kirk 1995: 53;
Stone 2001: 378).
5Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 567–68; Coleman v Power (2004)
220 CLR 1, 50, 57, 62.
6Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 138–39.
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disadvantaging some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudicial refusal to
recognise commonalities of interest. (1980: 103; see also Meagher 2005: 35)
The court has contrasted laws that directly prohibit or control political communi-
cation (Coleman 2004: 31; Levy 1997: 619),7 and laws with a different character,
whose effect on such communication is incidental or indirect.8 It is more difficult
to defend the constitutionality of the former.9
The court has determined that the implied freedom of political communication can
apply to state and federal laws,10 and to different methods of political communi-
cation, including political protests (Levy 1997).11 It is not confined to communication
by or to politicians, and includes communication among citizens.12 The meaning of
‘politics’ has been broadly interpreted to include discussion of possible police corrup-
tion,13 comments on Australia’s involvement in war,14 and advocacy with a view to
reversing government policy or administrative decisions (Martin 2011). It includes
both the right to express views and the right to hear them. The freedom is not confined
to statute law, and applies in relation to actions of the political executive. It can also
shape the common law on a particular topic.15
Debate has considered the philosophical basis of the Australian implied freedom.
Narrowly, it can be tied to ‘institutional democracy’, which aims to ensure that citi-
zens are exposed to a broad range of views so that they can exercise their vote in an
informed way (Fiss 1996: 101). Broadly, it can be tied to an idea of ‘participatory
democracy’, in which citizens are not simply passive recipients of information, but
have the right (or duty) to contribute actively to public debate (Maddison 2007:
28; Patmore 1998: 99–106). The High Court has appealed to both conceptions of
the implied freedom in its decisions (Chesterman 2000: 317). NGOs play an impor-
tant role, regardless of which conception of democracy is applied, but they are crucial
in the participatory model (Sawer 2002: 41; Yeatman 1998: 3, 17). They have been
described as ‘essential intermediaries’ between the community and government, con-
veying information about the needs and preferences of a wide range of often margin-
alised groups to governments that would otherwise not hear from such sections of
society, and are ‘essential components of a healthy and robust democracy’
(Maddison, Denniss and Hamilton 2004: vii).
The implied freedom has not been used to strike out a clause in a funding agree-
ment that makes funding conditional on the recipient’s abstention from lobbying.
7Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 619 (Gaudron J); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1,
31 (Gleeson CJ).
8Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555 (Gummow, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ);
Wotton v State of Queensland and Anor (2012) 246 CLR 1; Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, [64]
(French CJ), [342] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ); Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Common-
wealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 169.
9Wotton v State of Queensland and Anor (2012) 246 CLR 1, 16 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan
and Bell JJ); Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 76–7 (Deane and Toohey JJ).
10Wotton v State of Queensland and Anor (2012) 246 CLR 1, 15 (French CJ);Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243
CLR 506, 543, 555; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers (1994) 182 CLR 104, 232, 235.
11Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594, 614, 623, 638.
12Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
13Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 11, 24.
14Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, [361], [387].
15Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539, 556.
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Could the freedom be applied in this context to prevent such a condition being
attached to government funding?
A law that simply banned an organisation or individual from communicating about
legal reform or political change would likely infringe the constitutional freedom. In
terms of the two-stage test, it would burden communication about political matters.
This would be difficult to justify under the second limb: what legitimate end could
justify a law gagging political debate in Australia? The law would be constitutionally
invalid.
The present scenario is somewhat different because the government has not
directly passed a law banning political speech; rather, the government has made it
a condition of government funding, a term of a contract, that a funded organisation
not participate in such speech. According to the strict terms of the two-limbed test,
the first limb is not satisfied, since there is no law burdening freedom of communi-
cation, but a term of a contract that does so. Cases suggest (though this is never
the basis of the decision) that the freedom could apply to actions of the executive,16
including the granting of funding.17 This would overcome the argument that the
implied freedom does not apply here since there is no ‘law’.
Such a law is likely to be directed at the same end, and to achieve the same effect,
as legislation banning such speech. The question becomes whether the court should
allow something to be done indirectly, through a clause in a funding contract, that
could not be done directly, through legislation. If the answer is no, funding on con-
dition of non-lobbying is constitutionally invalid.18
No individual or organisation has a constitutional right to government funding.19
Governments are not obliged to fund community organisations, and might argue that
they are not, and should not be, required to fund advocacy. The argument is that if the
government is free to decide whether to fund an individual or agency, it can impose
conditions on the recipient of the funding.20 If the recipient does not like the con-
ditions, it does not have to accept the money.21 This argument suggests that
funding on condition of non-lobbying is constitutionally valid. Some counter that
governments must fund NGOs, including advocacy, because other voices, such as
business groups and middle-class interests, can fund themselves. NGOs may be
the only means of public communication for the marginalised (Lyons 2001: 222).
How should the High Court reconcile these arguments? Australian precedent does
not consider this point directly, but the issue of tying funding to suppression of
speech is not new. The Supreme Court of the United States has examined this
issue on many occasions. It is instructive to consider how the US court has reconciled
spending powers of government with rights to free speech, taking account of the
differences between the American free-speech provision and the Australian
version. The American provision applies to all speech, but the Australian version
applies, at present, only to political speech. This is not relevant here, however,
16Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, 560.
17Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 86 ALJR 713, 737, 747, 759, 818.
18Cummins v Missouri (1867) 71 US (4 Wall) 277.
19Regan v Taxation with Representation of Washington (1984) 461 US 540; Agency for International
Development v Alliance for an Open Society (2013) 133 S Ct.
20Western Union v Kansas (1910) 216 US 1, 53.
21South Australia v Commonwealth (1942) 65 CLR 373, 417; Agency for International Development v
Alliance for an Open Society (2013) 133 S Ct.
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since questions of funding restrictions arise, in both jurisdictions, in the context of
speech that is ‘political’. Nor is the other difference relevant: that the American
right is a positive right, but the right in Australia is negative, in the sense of
freedom from interference with such a right, rather than a ground on which a legal
claim may be asserted.
Three High Court judges stated that ‘there is little to be gained (in considering the
Australian implied freedom) by recourse to jurisprudence concerning the First
Amendment’.22 There should be no objection, however, to considering First Amend-
ment case law in respect of the implied freedom of political communication. The rel-
evance of American constitutional principles to the Australian context has been
recognised at the macro-level (Dixon 1965: 102; Winterton et al. 2007: 172; Zines
2008: 55).23 This is relevant to the Constitution generally, as well as to interpretation
of the implied freedom, where numerous uses of First Amendment case law and prin-
ciples have advanced Australian jurisprudence (Stone 1998: 220).24
American case law
American jurisprudence has shifted from the literal text of the First Amendment. For
instance, the First Amendment literally applies to laws that Congress has passed. The
court has departed from this text. It has deemed that the First Amendment extends to
state laws, as well as laws passed by Congress.25 In addition, the court has applied the
First Amendment where an action, not a law, is challenged. In Perry v Sindermann,26
for example, a teacher claimed that the non-renewal of his teaching contract was
based on his criticism of the college board. The court accepted that First Amendment
principles applied:
Even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental benefit and even
though the government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons,
there are some reasons upon which the government may not rely. It may not
deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests – especially his interest in freedom of speech. For if the government
could deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech
or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and
inhibited.27
22Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, [326] (Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
23Cheatle v The Queen (1993) 177 CLR 541, 556; Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR
318; Andrews v Howell (1941) 65 CLR 255, 282.
24Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 140, 143 (Mason CJ),
231, 235, 239 (McHugh J); Nationwide News v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1, 32 (Mason CJ), 79 (Deane and
Toohey JJ); Theophanous v Herald and Weekly Times Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 104, 130 (Mason CJ, Toohey
and Gaudron JJ), 177, 182 (Deane J); Levy v Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 594 (Brennan CJ), 623
(McHugh J), 638–42 (Kirby J); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1, 75 (Gummow and Hayne JJ);
Attorney-General (SA) v Corporation of the City of Adelaide [2013] HCA 3, [151] (Heydon J);
Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4, [27–8] (French CJ); Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246
CLR 1, 21 (Heydon J).
25Cantwell v Connecticut (1940) 310 US 296.
26Perry v Sindermann (1972) 408 US 593.
27Perry v Sindermann (1972) 408 US 593, 597; see also Elrod, Sheriff v Burns (1976) 427 US 347; Pick-
ering v Board of Education of Township High School (1968) 391 US 563.
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The court has also applied the First Amendment as a defence to a common law action
in tort,28 in a similar manner to how the court in Australia has used the implied
freedom to shape the common law.29
This approach could be used in Australia to overcome the argument that the
implied freedom does not apply to gag clauses in funding agreements because
such agreements are not laws. The American courts have extended the freedom
beyond ‘laws’, despite the literal terms of the First Amendment. They have done
so knowing that a narrow interpretation – that the Constitution only guards against
legislative provisions offensive to free speech – would allow governments to circum-
vent the requirement by resorting to other methods invasive of free speech.
The First Amendment applies to speech generally, rather than merely political
communication, as in the Australian version. The Supreme Court, however, tends
to apply First Amendment protection differentially, according to the nature of the
speech involved, with the strongest protection accorded to political speech:
The First Amendment has its fullest and most urgent protection in the case of regu-
lation of the content of political speech… above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.30
The Supreme Court has examined the question of linking funding or denial of
funding with speech. In Speiser v Randall, the court considered the constitutionality
of a law that exempted citizens from property tax if they pledged allegiance to the US
government. A taxpayer who refused to sign the oath was denied the exemption. In
effect, the law compelled speech as a condition of a government benefit. The taxpayer
successfully challenged the government decision on First Amendment grounds. The
court held that to deny an exemption to claimants who engaged in certain forms of
speech was to penalise them for such speech. It had the same deterrent effect as if
the state were to fine them for such speech.31
The court has developed the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions: that the gov-
ernment cannot deny benefits to people on a basis that infringes their constitutionally
protected freedom of speech, regardless of whether people (or organisations) are
entitled to that benefit.32 In Federal Communications Commission v League of
Women Voters of California, the court struck out a section in legislation allowing
for government agencies to provide funding to non-commercial providers of televi-
sion and radio services. A section of the Act forbade any provider who received
such funding from engaging in ‘editorialising’. The court noted that editorials have
traditionally played an important role in informing the public by critically comment-
ing on matters of public interest to ensure their broad discussion.33 Speech of that
28Snyder v Phelps (2011) 131 S Ct 1207.
29Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520; Aid/Watch v Commissioner of
Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539.
30Brown v Hartlage (1986) 456 US 45, 53; Snyder v Phelps (2011) 131 S Ct 1207, 1215; Police Depart-
ment of the City of Chicago et al. v Mosley (1972) 408 US 92, 95.
31Speiser v Randall (1958) 357 US 513, 518.
32Rumsfeld v Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights Inc (2006) 547 US 47, 59; United States v
American Library Association (2003) 539 US 194, 210.
33Federal Communications Commission v League of Women Voters of California (1984) 468 US 364,
382.
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kind was entitled to the highest protection, and the government had not demonstrated
a compelling interest in regulating it.
The Supreme Court has struggled to reconcile two competing ideas. First, Con-
gress is not obliged to fund particular viewpoints or subsidise the exercise of funda-
mental rights, including freedom of speech.34 Second, Congress may attempt to
influence speech indirectly by the selective use of funding, tax exemptions or other
means, placing First Amendment rights in jeopardy. As the court reiterated recently
in Agency for International Development:
Government may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his (or her)
constitutionally protected… freedom of speech even if (they) have no entitlement
to that benefit.35
The court has reconciled these ideas by distinguishing conditions placed on the use of
funding, and conditions that leverage funding to regulate speech outside the specific
programme being funded. The court has recognised that the line can be difficult to
draw, however, and care must be taken to stop Congress recasting programmes to
fall artificially on the ‘constitutional’ side of the line. The court is wary of conditions
on funding that prevent recipients from asserting beliefs contrary to the
government.36
Congress has also attempted to limit funding to groups that might make particular
legal arguments. For example, Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez concerned a
law by which Congress specifically prohibited the appellant from funding any organ-
isation that assisted clients to seek to amend or challenge welfare law, including on
the grounds of constitutional law (Yoder 1998). The appellant successfully chal-
lenged this. Congress could not seek to insulate its own laws from legitimate judicial
challenge. Its decision could not aim to suppress ideas perceived as contrary to the
government’s interests.37 Such a law struck at the heart of First Amendment
freedoms.
The court is aware that Congress may seek to achieve indirectly what it cannot
achieve directly. The court considered the validity of a state law requiring a
private carrier to become a common carrier as a condition of the right to do business
in that state, and noted:
It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which,
by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the
federal constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished
under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which
the state threatens otherwise to withhold… as a general rule, the state having power
to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to
impose. But the power of the state in that respect is not unlimited, and… it may
not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights.38
34Rust v Sullivan (1991) 500 US 173; Regan v Taxation with Representation of Washington (1984) 461
US 540; Agency for International Development v Alliance for an Open Society (2013) 133 S. Ct.
35Agency for International Development v Alliance for an Open Society (2013) 133 S. Ct, 16.
36Agency for International Development v Alliance for an Open Society (2013) 133 S. Ct, 17, 23.
37Legal Services Corporation v Velazquez (2001) 531 US 533, 549.
38Frost v Frost Railroad Commission of California (1926) 271 US 583, 593–94.
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The court has been particularly concerned with restrictions pertaining to content.39
Even more serious are restrictions on particular viewpoints in relation to a topic.
These kinds of restrictions would be unlikely to survive a First Amendment chal-
lenge, unless they apply to a limited public forum on a particular topic.40 In order
to defend such laws, it would be necessary to show a compelling state interest,
and that the law was narrowly tailored towards achieving that particular
objective.41
In summary, the Supreme Court has responded to the possibility that Congress,
since it cannot directly proscribe speech based on content or viewpoint, might seek
to achieve its aims indirectly by refusing to fund speech with which it disagrees.
As a result, governments are not permitted to provide funding on the condition
that recipients maintain silence on matters of interest to them, or on the condition
that a party will not advocate for law reform. These precedents are analogous to
current moves by Australian governments to limit the contribution of funding recipi-
ents to public debate.
The Supreme Court of the United States has not accepted that such actions are
consistent with rights to free speech; nor should the High Court of Australia. Cer-
tainly, there are differences between freedom of speech in the US, and the narrower
freedom of political communication in Australia. Those differences are not relevant
here because we are discussing the freedom of community organisations to speak
about political and legal issues rather than more general speech, and whether
such organisations should be defended from interference by the government in
the form of provisions in funding contracts. This is consistent with the negative con-
ception of the freedom in Australia, that is, freedom from interference by govern-
ment, not a positive source of rights. This does not, however, render American
jurisprudence irrelevant.
Waiving constitutional freedoms
The American doctrine of unconstitutional conditions
Can a theoretical framework be constructed to better understand when it is permiss-
ible to waive constitutional freedoms? There is little Australian authority on this ques-
tion, but American jurisprudence recognises the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions. The doctrine states that governments cannot grant benefits on the con-
dition that beneficiaries surrender their constitutional rights, but the government
could, if it wished, withhold benefits altogether (Sullivan 1989: 1415). This doctrine
could be used to challenge the constitutional validity of funding NGOs on the basis
that they do not exercise freedom of political communication, accepting that discus-
sion in the US takes place in the context of a ‘right’ with different scope to the Aus-
tralian ‘freedom’. This might inhibit application of the doctrine of unconstitutional
conditions in Australia, unless the court was prepared to consider a broader con-
ception of the freedom.
39Police Department of the City of Chicago et al. v Mosley (1972) 408 US 92, 95.
40Rosenberger v Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (1995) 515 US 819, 830.
41Simon and Schuster v Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board (1991) 502 US 105,
117–18.
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The inalienability of constitutional freedoms
Some freedoms may be so fundamental that they are inalienable (International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights; Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Locke
1960). They may be inalienable because not merely a personal right of an individual
is at stake. Broader community interests are at stake, which an individual cannot be
expected to consider.
The argument for the purposes of this article is that it is not legally possible for a
funded organisation to relinquish those freedoms, or to make funding conditional on
relinquishing those freedoms, because they cannot be sold. The fundamental freedom
of communication belongs as much to the speaker (the funded organisation) as to
those who would listen. As the High Court has acknowledged in this context, it is
a two-sided freedom (Cole 1992: 680).42 A two-sided freedom cannot be sold by
the agreement of only one.
If it is accepted that constitutional freedoms, such as the implied freedom of pol-
itical communication, are inalienable, then the argument that the power to do the
greater (deny funding altogether) includes the power to do the lesser (provide
funding on certain conditions) can similarly be dismissed. For instance, the govern-
ment has the power to provide public housing for those in need of it. Surely, this does
not mean that the government has the power to provide public housing only to white
Australians, and not to other races. Such an action would rightly be condemned as
racially discriminatory. In other words, the fact that the government has the power
to provide public housing does not enable it to act in an unlawful manner by discri-
minating in the provision of services. Similarly, the fact that the government has the
power to deny funding does not allow it to provide funding on condition of relin-
quishment of constitutional rights.
A theory that constitutional freedoms, whether explicit or implicit, are inalienable
would also answer the suggestion in American43 and Australian44 cases that the
purpose of the law is relevant in assessing its compatibility with free-speech protec-
tions. A purpose-based test has several problems, including identifying which
purpose/s are proscribed, difficulties where an act might be argued to have multiple
purposes, some of which are legitimate and others illegitimate (Kreimer 1984: 1334–
38), and the possibility that effects on freedom of speech are sidelined.45 In Australia,
the two-stage test partly ameliorates these problems by focusing on aspects other than
purpose, including, in the first stage, the extent to which the law burdens political
speech and, in the second, reference to the ‘manner’ in which the law operates.46
Australian law has included argument about the inalienability of constitutional
freedoms. This occurred in the context of an attempted waiver of an express right
to jury trial in the Constitution. There is no reason to suppose that the view of inalien-
ability in the constitutional sense should differ according to whether we discuss an
express provision or an implied one. The jury provision is often referred to as a
‘right’, but the freedom of political communication is a freedom in the nature of a
42Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 232.
43Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No 26 v Pico (1982) 457 US 853, 871;
Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (1983) 460 US 575, 592.
44Levy v State of Victoria (1997) 189 CLR 579, 619 (Gaudron J); Coleman v Power (2004) 220 CLR 1,
31 (Gleeson CJ); Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 31 (Kiefel J).
45Sherbert v Verner (1963) 374 US 398, 404.
46Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 31–32.
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‘negative right’. I acknowledge these differences, but they do not justify a different
view on the question of whether a constitutional freedom (or right) can be waived
or alienated. I now discuss the High Court’s consideration of the attempted waiver
of the constitutional right in Section 80.
In Brown v The Queen, the High Court considered whether an accused could waive
the right to jury trial in Section 80 of the Constitution. The court rejected this sugges-
tion. Justice Deane found that the ‘right’ to jury trial was not simply a personal right
or privilege of the accused, but reflected broader community interests. Justice
Dawson agreed that use of the jury had public advantages, and its benefits were
not confined to the individual accused. In other cases where a person has been
allowed to waive statutory benefits, the right was merely a personal or private one,
not of a broader nature involving public policy.47
I argue that the High Court should not allow an NGO to waive (or, more accurately,
should not allow a government to require an NGO to waive) its freedom of political
communication, for the same reason the court gave in Brown to not permit an accused
person to waive the right to trial by jury. In both cases, the freedom or right is not a
personal one that the individual may relinquish. Broader community interests are at
play. Because it is not a personal right, individuals cannot voluntarily trade it for gov-
ernment funding, and it is constitutionally unacceptable for the government to make
funding conditional on the waiver of that right (Kreimer 1984: 1387). As the High
Court has confirmed repeatedly, it is critical to representative democracy, for
which the Constitution provides, that the public be exposed to a full range of
views on matters of a political nature. Community groups play a pivotal role in
giving voice to matters of public concern. It is anathema to representative democracy
for a government to seek, directly or indirectly, to silence those voices it would prefer
the voting public not to hear (Gelber 2011: 144).
The two-stage test for conditional funding agreements
Does the law burden freedom of communication about government or political
matters in terms or effect?
I have explained how the court could deal with the problem that the freedom, as
currently constructed, is confined to laws rather than funding agreements. American
case law has supported broadening the freedom beyond application to laws, given
that government should not be able to achieve indirectly what it cannot constitution-
ally achieve directly. The principle is what is important, rather than the form of the
intrusion. Funding agreements conditional on non-advocacy have significant poten-
tial to undermine the constitutional freedom. The High Court has accepted the prin-
ciple that what the Constitution forbids directly, it also forbids indirectly.48
The requirement otherwise clearly burdens freedom of communication about pol-
itical matters. An argument for law reform is a political argument, given that the main
purpose of parliaments is to make and change laws. The High Court recently con-
firmed, in a different context, that advocates for changing government policy are
engaged in political activities. The court noted the Constitution’s insistence on
47Brown v The Queen (1986) 160 CLR 171, 202, 208.
48ICM Agriculture Pty Ltd v Commonwealth of Australia (2009) 240 CLR 140, 170, 216; New South
Wales v Commonwealth (1949) 76 CLR 1, 350; British Medical Association v Commonwealth (1949)
79 CLR 201; Commonwealth v Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1, 283.
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representative and responsible government and the implied freedom of political com-
munication, and observed that: ‘the system of law which applies in Australia thus
postulates for its operation ... agitation for legislative and political changes’.49 Advo-
cacy for legal change and lobbying fall within the ambit of what can be considered
‘political’ (Stone 2001: 384–85).50 The answer to the first limb of the two-stage
test is therefore ‘yes’.
Is the law reasonably appropriate and adapted to serving a legitimate end in a
manner which is compatible with the maintenance of representative and responsible
government which the Constitution prescribes?51
The High Court has distinguished between laws that directly and/or substantially
prohibit or control political communication, and laws with a different character
whose effect on such communication is indirect and/or incidental.52 The former
are more difficult to justify,53 requiring compelling justification. The relevant con-
ditions of funding contracts belong to the first category. The judge will therefore
require a ‘compelling justification’.54
The government does not admit that such provisions are intended to gag what can
be uncomfortable debate about a law. Governments may not appreciate criticism of a
law that is overtly, or in effect, producing unfair outcomes. Modern governments
have become increasingly concerned with managing the media cycle, and it is reason-
able to imply that media managers might seek to silence dissent from those who rely
on government funds for their survival.
The government might have a stronger argument that it is the trustee of public
funds and has a legitimate interest in ensuring that scarce funds are allocated to the
most efficient use, and that it should have the right to dictate how funds are spent.
The High Court would need to weigh this argument (if this is a legitimate end com-
patible with representative and/or responsible government) in light of the fundamen-
tal importance of freedom of political communication in Australia’s system of
representative government. The US Supreme Court, however, has not looked
kindly on restrictions applying selectively to some speakers on a topic. For instance,
inMinnesota Star and Tribune Co,55 one of the difficulties with the tax on the use of
ink and paper was that, due to exemptions, it applied only to a few newspapers. The
court noted that laws drafted in such a way could potentially be abused. These laws
could have the same effect as content-based restrictions on speech, distorting the
market for ideas. The narrow base of the tax might limit political fallout for the gov-
ernment.56 In the Australian context, therefore, it is difficult to see how a restriction
narrowly aimed at only a small number of contributors to a political debate could
satisfy the test of ‘compelling justification’.
49Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation (2010) 241 CLR 539, 551, 556 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne,
Crennan and Bell JJ), 565 (Kiefel J).
50Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506.
51Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520, as reinterpreted in Coleman v
Power (2004) 220 CLR 1.
52Hogan v Hinch (2011) 243 CLR 506, 555 (Gummow, Heydon, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ).
53Wotton v State of Queensland (2012) 246 CLR 1, 16 (French CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Bell
JJ).
54Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106, 143 (Mason CJ), 235
(McHugh J).
55Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co v Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue (1983) 460 US 575.
56Leathers, Commissioner of Revenues for Arkansas v Medlock (1991) 499 US 439, 503.
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Furthermore, in the context of the implied freedom, the court has considered propor-
tionality, including whether the intrusion on the implied freedom is ‘minimalist’ com-
pared with the legitimate objective it seeks to meet (Meagher 2005: 501).57 In relation
to the funding arrangements noted at the beginning of this article, at the least the ban on
linking towebsites where interested parties can obtain advocacy advice fails this test. It
is not necessary, in order to secure a legitimate objective, that community legal centres
or other organisations use taxpayers’money for the specific (non-advocacy) purposes
for which it was given, or that organisations do not provide information on where
parties seeking advocacy services should go. If the court found that the provision of
government funding on condition that the recipient does not engage in political com-
munication failed the two-stage test, the government’s power to fundNGOswould not
be in question; rather, its funding capacity should not be conditional on the recipient’s
engagement or non-engagement in political communication.
Conclusion
NGOs are essential to democracy, providing a voice to groups that would otherwise
be marginalised. Their role is under threat with the growing use of clauses making
funding conditional on non-engagement in political dialogue. This article has
argued that such clauses might be challenged using the implied freedom of political
communication. It has drawn on First Amendment jurisprudence, where freedom of
speech has been considered in relation to these issues. The debate also concerns the
nature of the democracy for which the Constitution provides, and the nature of rights
and freedoms, including political communication. The High Court has found that a
constitutional right is inalienable.
Rights and freedoms are not absolute, but justification is required for incursion on
fundamental freedoms such as political communication. The law must respond pro-
portionally to an identified legitimate end. Governments have a responsibility as the
custodian of public funds. Attempts to gag voices in debate over contentious political
issues, especially the voices of people who might not otherwise be heard, are not pro-
portional responses to that legitimate end, given the fundamental nature of political
communication. These are content-based restrictions requiring ‘compelling justifica-
tion’, which is not demonstrated. Freedom of political communication is an inalien-
able freedom. The High Court has been wary of parties waiving their constitutional
freedoms, particularly where the freedom is not theirs alone, but part of a broader con-
ception of representative democracy. Not merely the freedom of community centres
to speak is at stake, but the freedom of individuals to hear their contributions and
those of the people they represent, and to consider arguments in favour of law
reform. Such voices should not be silenced.
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